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In the present paper it is argued that the original model of formal operations 
failed to make a clear distinction between the organization of knowledge and the 
ability to solve tasks. Additionally, too much emphasis was placed on the scien- 
tific reasoning aspect of formal operations in previous accounts. The present 
paper proceeds by first describing a recasted model of formal operations which 
retains only its essential, nondeletable aspects. Relevant empirical literature is 
reviewed within the perspective of this recasted model. Then, some positive 
heuristics, i.e., methodological approaches designed to avoid anomalous results, 
are proposed as direct tests of this model. Finally, the similarity and differences 
between the present account and other accounts of formal operations are dis- 
cussed. 0 19R8 Academic Press, Inc. 
Current thinking regarding the stage of formal operations is that the 
model has lost a good deal of its explanatory value (e.g., Braine & Ru- 
main, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Keating, 1980; Strauss & Kroy, 1977). 
For the most part, the decline in interest in the formal operations model 
can be linked to the shift in paradigms or research programs (Kuhn, 1962; 
Lakatos, 1971; Overton, 1984) away from Piagetian theory in general, 
which emphasizes the generality of structures, toward views of concep- 
tual development which explain age differences in terms of domain spec- 
ificity and the acquisition of expertise (e.g., Carey, 1985; Chi, Glaser & 
Rees, 1982; Keil, 1985). This shift is particularly important for the formal 
operations model because one of the specific advances of formal thought 
over concrete thought has been proposed to be the capacity to reason 
about any content whatsoever (Inhelder & Piaget, 1969). Additionally, the 
model has lost favor because of some evidence which shows that not all 
adolescents and adults demonstrate formal operational reasoning either 
on Inhelder & Piaget’s (1958) tasks (Keating, 1980; Neimark, 1979) or on 
related measures like Wason’s (1966) Four-Card task (Wason, 1983). A 
further problem is that the logic itself and Inhelder & Piaget’s explanation 
of it contain several apparent contradictions, specifically regarding the 
concept of equivalence (Braine & Rumain, 1983; Ennis, 1975; Leiser, 
1982). 
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Keating for extremely useful criticisms and cogent comments. Reprint requests should be 
addressed to James P. Byrnes, Developmental Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, MI 48109. 
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Recent philosophers of science have explained the historical accep- 
tance or rejection of theoretical paradigms in terms of positive heuristics, 
or the ability of a theory to anticipate and avoid potentially falsifying 
instances (Lakatos, 1971). More specifically, a family of theories, or a 
research programme, consists of a hard core of philosophical assumptions 
which are protected from falsification by a belt of auxiliary hypotheses, 
and also consists of the positive heuristics which outline research strat- 
egies designed to avoid the accumulation of falsifying instances. An 
example of a hard core assumption of Piagetian theory would be that 
knowledge is neither innate nor learned but is constructed. The construc- 
tivist aspect of the theory is never questioned by adherents to the tradi- 
tion and is protected from falsification by auxiliary hypotheses such as 
“The source of knowledge is the child’s actions on the world.” The 
premise is that one would have to falsify the causal role of actions in the 
formation of logical structures before one could begin to consider the 
viability of the constructivist epistemology. Beilin (1985) lists structure- 
function analysis, activity, and stages as other candidates for core as- 
sumptions and Rowe11 (1983) proposes equilibration. 
Lakatos (1971) argues that the viability of a theory relies upon the 
ability to avoid mounting falsifying evidence. If too many falsifying in- 
stances occur, the scientific community shifts to models that better ex- 
hibit the capacity to explain anomalies. This view seems to descriptively 
account well for the shift away from the Piagetian model, although 
Laudan (1977) criticizes Lakatos’ position for, among other things, not 
specifying how many falsifying instances are necessary for the rejection 
of a given theory. 
The present paper is an attempt to recast the Formal Operations model 
in light of current criticisms in such a way so as to retain the viable 
aspects of the model, and to also point out which aspects lead to anom- 
alies and are, hence, dispensable. The paper proceeds by first proposing 
essential aspects of the formal operations model which must be retained 
in order that it be consistent with the rest of the theory. As each essential 
aspect is described, current research which addresses this aspect is in- 
troduced. Finally, some positive heuristics and suggestions for future 
research are discussed. 
ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF FORMAL OPERATIONAL THOUGHT 
Inhelder and Piaget (19.58) and Piaget (1972) provide the most extensive 
treatments of the formal operations logic and can be used to consider the 
fundamental and useful aspects of this level of thought. In the present 
analysis, Piaget’s (1972) Essai de Logique Operatoire is considered to be 
the most accurate and consistent treatment of the nature of the logic since 
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it contains many of the revisions of the model after the 1950s. The present 
thesis, therefore, relies most heavily on this work. Inhelder and Piaget’s 
(1958) The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence is 
considered here to be a “content” book focused on how the acquired 
propositional logic can be applied in scientific problem-solving situations. 
Support for this view comes from the fact that Inhelder gathered the 
experimental data for the 1958 book independently of Piaget’s theoretical 
formalization of the formal operations model (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, 
p. xxi). 
What follows is my own analysis of the essential aspects of formal 
operations that is based on the above two works, as well as on other 
translated and untranslated Genevan studies which address formal rea- 
soning. Similar to Beilin (1985), I consider a given aspect to be essential 
if it meets two criteria. The first is whether the aspect has had a long 
history in Piagetian theory and has survived Piaget’s own revisions of his 
theory from the 1920s up to the late 1970s. The second is Beilin’s (1985) 
deletion criteria. Here, an aspect is to be retained if deleting it from the 
theory would produce substantial changes that would make the theory no 
longer recognizable as Piaget’s. This deletion criteria is, of course, largely 
intuitive, but can be supported with an appeal to the internal consistency 
of the theory; that is, if the aspect has analogs at the sensorimotor, pre- 
operational, or concrete operational levels, it should be retained. 
It should be pointed out that as far as I know, Piaget never disavowed 
in writing any of the claims he made in Inhelder and Piaget (1958), though 
there is reason to believe that he did become disenchanted with using the 
formal operations model to explain scientific reasoning in later works. 
First, he never reintroduced the model to explain causal reasoning in 
Piaget (1974) which represented a compilation of over 100 studies of cau- 
sal reasoning. Second, it is reasonable to assume that he was quite af- 
fected by the noted philosopher E. Beth’s attack of the model since he 
cowrote a concilatory book with Beth years later (i.e., Beth & Piaget, 
1966). Moreover, since Piaget rarely made references to older, weaker 
versions of his theory in the process of introducing apparent changes in it, 
one often has to make inferences about problems in old models on the 
basis of new changes. Hence, the following recasted model is largely my 
interpretation of the viable aspects of the theory. 
A further, and important preliminary point is that the present formula- 
tion and review of relevant literature is radically different from other 
current reviews of formal operational reasoning like Neimark (1979) or 
Keating (1980). In the present analysis, I make an a priori distinction 
between the organization of knowledge at a given level of development 
and the knowledge of how to solve a task. This is similar to Ryle’s dis- 
tinction between “knowing that” and “knowing how” (Ryle, 1971). It is 
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argued here that at every level, Piaget’s models of structures (e.g., formal 
operations) represent the organization of knowledge in the mind of the 
child (i.e., “knowing that”). As a result of this organization, it is argued 
that children employ specific task solution strategies (e.g., formal oper- 
ational schemata) to solve the tasks presented to them (i.e., “knowing 
how”). An example which can illustrate the distinction and relation be- 
tween “knowing that” and “knowing how” is the relation between chil- 
dren’s comprehension of order and their ability to seriate at the level of 
concrete operations. Concrete operational children understand that an 
object can be both bigger than one object and smaller than another at the 
same time, due to the “grouping” of “primary addition of relations” 
(Flavell, 1963). Piaget formalized this structural understanding (“knowing 
that”) in his notion of “grouping.” This concept is the source of the task 
solution strategy (“knowing how”) of holding the sticks in one hand and 
selecting the largest (or smallest) stick remaining in order to complete the 
array. 
When one attempts to find such a straightforward relation at the formal 
level, however, it becomes clear that Inhelder and Piaget (1958) failed to 
keep the two forms of knowledge distinct. In particular, the structural 
model they chose (i.e., the 16 binary operations of propositional logic) 
should be used to formalize the organization of knowledge about object 
properties, classes, etc. Hence, the 16 binary operations are a formaliza- 
tion of “knowing that.” Throughout the 1958 book, however, the prop- 
ositions are often used to formalize the schemata or task solution strate- 
gies (“knowing how”). I argue that this is a misapplication of the prop- 
ositional logic which has lead to conceptual difficulties in the theory as 
well as an overemphasis in the American literature on the formal opera- 
tional schemata. In addition, Hintikka (1975) shows how “knowing that” 
knowledge is not reducible to “knowing how” knowledge, thereby dem- 
onstrating that these two forms of knowledge are logically distinct. There- 
fore the “knowing how” aspect of formal operations is best left to struc- 
tural models such as Siegler’s (1976) rules for the balance task. An addi- 
tional problem is that, unlike the above seriation example, there is no 
clear, specified relation between the knowledge which the binary opera- 
tions represent and the schemata such as proportionality to be found in 
Inhelder and Piaget (1958). 
It is preliminarily proposed here that “knowing that” knowledge allows 
for setting up goals of task solution which are based on an intuitive notion 
of what form the answer will probably take, and that the “knowing how” 
knowledge for a given task is acquired through trial and error or instruc- 
tion. This characterization cannot account, however, for cases where 
subjects know how to solve problems with proper rote strategies but fail 
to comprehend when to apply the solution strategies or how the problem 
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fits into a conceptual framework (e.g., Chi et al’s (1982) physics novices 
or undergraduates in a statistics course). Therefore, the precise relation 
between “knowing how” and “knowing that” knowledge at the level of 
formal operations remains to be specified. While this is an important 
topic, it is outside the scope of the present paper. 
The present review considers the essential aspects of formal operations 
with respect to the organization of knowledge. Neimark (1979) or Keating 
(1980), on the other hand, largely review studies which have essentially 
attempted to verify the existence of schemata such as isolation of vari- 
ables and proportionality. These studies are not reviewed in the present 
paper because it is argued that they only indirectly assess the essential 
aspects proposed here. I come back to this point later. 
With all this in mind, I turn now to a discussion of the essential aspects 
of the formal operations model. These aspects can be listed as a series of 
postulates: (a) formal operations are operations on operations; (b) formal 
operations permit the construction of all possible combinations of object 
attributes; (c) the formal operations model is a propositional representa- 
tion consisting of the relations among the 16 binary operations as form 
and statements about class relations or properties serving a “bilevel” 
content; and (d) formal operations permit hypothetical thinking due to the 
ability to reason about statements referring to properties of objects rather 
than simply reasoning directly about objects. It is from these essential 
aspects that the correlative schemata such as isolation of variables and 
proportions are derived. I leave aside the role of these schemas in order 
to describe each of the essential aspects in turn. 
OPERATIONS ON OPERATIONS 
The aspect of operations on operations derives from Piaget’s (1972) 
definition of “structure” as “every link capable of playing, alternatively 
or simultaneously, the role of form and the role of content” (p. 40). This 
means that each cognitive level in the theory can be characterized by 
structures that have unique form and unique content. Additionally, the 
form of a given level becomes the content of the next level. Hence, the 
form of the sensorimotor level (i.e., schemes) become the content of 
preoperational thought (i.e., mental imagery). The same is true for the 
concrete and formal operational levels. If the form of concrete operations 
consists of inclusion relations, then the form of formal operations consists 
of inclusions of inclusions (Piaget et al., 1977). 
Significant insights are gained within knowledge domains when second 
order operations like inclusion of inclusions are constructed at the formal 
operations level. This is particularly so regarding the role of negation 
(Piaget et al., 1977). More specifically, negation consists of the simple 
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complementarity of classes at the concrete operational level when classes 
are organized around inclusion relations; that is, a subclass such as A and 
it’s complement A’ are related through the superordinate category B. If 
B = “dogs,” A = “terriers,” and A’ = “non-terrier dogs,” the elements 
of class A’ are those objects which possess properties characteristic of 
“dogs” but do not possess the properties which are unique to “terriers.” 
Thus, negation so construed means simply complementarity within a 
given inclusion relation. 
Eventually, however, the inclusion relations at a given level become 
integrated together through the subordination of these classes to an even 
higher superordinate category (hence, the inclusion of inclusions). This 
new development is depicted in Table 1. This simple example shows how 
the classes of “cats” and “dogs” can be united through the superordinate 
category of “mammals.” In effect, the two inclusion structures of “dogs” 
and “cats” (i.e., A + A’ = B and C + C’ = D) become further nested 
into a higher superordinate category. What this means is that whereas 
negating class A prior to this structuration resulted in simply the class A’, 
now negation consists of the class A’ plus those elements under D (Piaget 
et al., 1977). 
As will be discussed in a later section, a formal operational subject can 
access this organization of knowledge by way of propositions or state- 
ments. A new class of inferences is made possible when the child con- 
structs a propositional representation of these inclusions of inclusions. 
Take, for example, the inferences around a statement of implication such 
as “if it’s a terrier then it’s a dog.” Negation of the antecedent of the 
statement (p), “it’s a terrier”, results in “it’s not a terrier” (not-p). Ar- 
ranging the arguments into a syllogism, one obtains as a major premise “If 
it’s a terrier then it’s a dog” and as a minor premise “It’s not a terrier.” 
Given these premises, one cannot tell whether the conclusion is “it’s a 
TABLE I 
Two INCLUSIONS NESTED WITHIN A HIGHER SUPERORDINATE CATEGORY 
Mammals (E) 
Dogs 09 Cats (I>) 
Terriers (A) Non-terriers (A’) Persian (C) Non-Persian (C’) 
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non-terrier dog” or “it’s a non-dog.” Hence, there is inherent indetermi- 
nacy. The correct response, then, is “can’t tell.” Prior to this structur- 
ization, the Piagetian model would predict that children would not say 
“can’t tell” but would say either that it’s a non-terrier dog (e.g., “it’s a 
collie”) or it’s a non-dog (e.g., “it’s a cat”) because these two alterna- 
tives have not been integrated together in a nested inclusion. Such a 
prediction is obviously testable. Thus, the correct response is provided by 
the construction of operations on operations. 
There have been relatively few studies which can be considered to have 
directly addressed the aspect of nested inclusions. One study which has 
considered the changes in the meaning of negation as a result of nested 
inclusions is Voelin-Liambey and Berthoud-Papadropoulou (in Piaget et 
al., 1977). The results from this study showed that (a) the appreciation of 
indeterminate inferences about statements of implication was initially ap- 
parent in lo-to 1 1-year-olds and (b) simple class-inclusion reasoning was 
insufficient for correct performance. As described above, the correct 
“can’t tell” response is provided by interrelating two inclusions such as 
(a) mammals = dogs + non-dogs and (b) non-dogs = non-dog mammals 
+ non-dog, non-mammals. Byrnes and Overton (1986) found the iden- 
tical age trends using sufficient causality semantic content within syllo- 
gisms. Numerous other studies have shown that the “can’t tell” response 
on syllogisms is generally not found prior to adolescence (see Braine & 
Rumain, 1983, for a review). Performance levels are very high when task 
statements describe familiar semantic content which can be organized 
through inclusion relations (e.g., sufficient causality), and when feedback 
procedures which reduce inappropriate construals of “if’ are used. These 
manipulations are only effective, however, beginning around age 10 to Il. 
Hence, there is empirical support for the predicted changes in perfor- 
mance on syllogisms which can be explained by the progressive nesting of 
inclusions. Of course, tasks other than the conditional syllogism would be 
appropriate for assessing similar changes in knowledge structures and 
could be based on the notion of operations on operations. As yet few 
studies have approached developmental change in knowledge structures 
using this notion. 
CONSTRUCTION OF ALL POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS 
The aspect of combinatorial reasoning partially derives from the former 
aspect of operations on operations; that is, with continued nesting of 
inclusions, a complete lattice structure can be formed with the universe of 
possibilities as an upper bound and the empty class as the lower bound 
(Flavell, 1963). This combinatorial aspect has been more recently 
couched within a new explanatory mechanism in Piagetian theory called 
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constructive generalization (Piaget et al., 1978). Constructive generaliza- 
tion does not consist of the assimilation of new contents to already con- 
stituted forms, but rather, refers to the engendering of new forms and new 
contents, i.e., new structural organizations. An example of constructive 
generalization is the reciprocal assimilation of two schemes of the same 
rank. Within this perspective, the universe of possibilities is constructed 
through the generalization of vicariance relations. Vicariance is a con- 
crete operational ability where the child can take a set of objects and 
classify them along different dimensions. For example, with a set con- 
sisting of both big and small red squares and big and small green circles, 
the child can group and regroup objects based on color, size, or shape. 
The formal operational child can consider two or more of these vicariance 
relations simultaneously, can carry out vicariance operations exhaustive- 
ly, and can accurately quantify the extension of classes of objects that fall 
into two or more categories at the same time (Piaget et al., 1978). This 
ability serves as the basis for the distinction between “and” and “or” 
and, hence, the understanding of the intersection of classes. 
A number of recent studies have considered children’s combinatorial 
reasoning ability (e.g., Douglas & Wong, 1977; Flexer & Roberge, 1980; 
Kuhn & Angelev, 1976; Lawson, 1977; Martorano, 1977; Neimark, 1975; 
Roberge, 1976; Roberge & Flexer, 1979; Saarni, 1973). Almost all these 
studies show that by the eighth grade (i.e., 13 years old) 80-90% of sub- 
jects accurately generate the various combinations required. However, 
several studies show that this performance is better for combinations of 
colored tokens than for the original Inhelder and Piaget (1958) chemicals 
tasks. 
It should be pointed out that whereas the focus of this review is on the 
organization of knowledge and not on task solution strategies, combina- 
torial reasoning is considered by Inhelder and Piaget to be one of the 
formal operational schemata. However, it can be argued that the ability to 
generate all the possible combinations very closely reflects the subject’s 
ability to mentally organize the information hierarchically along the com- 
bined properties. Additionally, Piaget et al. (1978) present evidence of a 
progressive development from understanding vicariance at age 7 to 8, to 
an understanding of all possible combinations of object properties at age 
I1 to 12. Since the results of this study are presented in the form of 
protocols, it is in need of replication. Nevertheless, there is substantial 
support for this structural prediction. 
PROPOSITIONAL REPRESENTATION 
In addition to the insights gained due to the acquisition of operations on 
operations and to the construction of all combinations, there is the emer- 
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gence of propositional reasoning at the formal operations level. In partic- 
ular, the class knowledge acquired at the level of concrete operations 
becomes reorganized and accessible by way of a network of propositions 
about this acquired knowledge. In order to make precise what proposi- 
tional reasoning entails, it is best to begin with a few definitions. For 
Piaget (1972), propositions are 
categorical statements, true or false and affirmative and negative To say that 
the statement is categorical excludes imperatives and optatives, but does not ex- 
clude the truth or falsity of a proposition that can be proved by virtue of a simple 
hypothesis. To say that a statement is true or false implies that it has meaning, as 
opposed to a statement devoid of meaning. (p. 34). 
Hence propositions are meaningful statements of which one knows the 
truth or falsity and through which one reasons about categorical content 
(e.g., classes or properties). Of course, propositions can also be state- 
ments whose truth is merely assumed for the sake of argument such as 
counterfactual conditionals (Matalon, 1962). 
Such propositions can be composed and compared by way of an inter- 
propositional operation which is 
every composition which allows one to construct-by means of some propositions 
. other propositions well-determined and characterized respectively by the var- 
ious possible combinations of only those respective truth values. (p. 34) 
Table 2 summarizes various interpropositional operations. This table 
shows that a subject can, for example, compose “it’s a terrier” with “it’s 
a dog” into the conditional “If it’s a terrier then it’s a dog” or the dis- 
junctive “Either it’s a dog or it’s a terrier. ” Moreover, transitive relations 
between propositions (e.g., “if p then q; if q then r; therefore if p then r”) 




e.g., (It’s an A) + (It’s a B) -a Either it’s an A or B 
B. Transitive inferences 
e.g., (If p then q) + (If q then r) + (If p then r) 
C. Falsification 
e.g., (If p then q) + (p and not-q) ---f (If p then q) is false 
D. Equivalence relations 
e.g., (Either p or q)’ = (If not-p then q) 
(Q if and only if p) = (Either p or not-q)’ 
11 The symbol “-+” is roughly meant to represent “yields” and does not mean strict 
implication. Also the symbol “ + ” means “composed with.” 
b Inclusive disjunction. 
’ Exclusive disjunction. 
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A further important interpropositional operation is negation. Every bi- 
nary operation is linked uniquely to another binary operation which is its 
negation. The negation operation represents the cancellation or nullifica- 
tion of a direct operation in that if the direct operation is true, its negation 
must be false and if the negation is true, then the direct must be false. As 
shown in Table 2, the truth of the proposition “p and not-q” (e.g., “it is 
a dog and a non-mammal”) would mean that the proposition “if p then q” 
(e.g., “if it’s a dog then it’s a mammal”) is false. Depicted in terms of 
classes as in Piaget (1972), the negation operation represents those classes 
which are excluded from the arrangement of classes specified by the 
direct operation. It is in this way that the negation operation is the com- 
plement of the direct operation under complete affirmation (i.e., the uni- 
verse of possibilities). Table 3 shows implication and its negation as rep- 
resented by classes. It is important to note that to construct a direct 
operation and thus understand which cases are permissible, one must 
simultaneously construct the negation operation and thus understand 
which cases are impossible. Hence, the construction of all possible com- 
binations and the construction of the negation operation mutually imply 
one another. 
TABLE 3 
IXJPLICATION AND ITS NEGATION OPERATION 
Direct 
Total 
Dogs (q) Non-dogs (3 
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The last important interpropositional operation listed in Table 2 is the 
formation of equivalence relations among binary operations. Every bina- 
ry operation can be phrased in multiple equivalent ways. It is in this way 
that the model specifies that “either p or q” and “if not-p then q” can be 
used to refer to the same state of affairs between the events described in 
the propositions “p” and “q” (i.e., a disjunctive relation between “p” 
and “q”). 
It should be pointed out that what makes reasoning at this levelformal 
is that it no longer bears directly on objects, but rather, on statements 
about objects and the relations between statements, in almost a metalin- 
guistic sense. The form of formal operations, then, consists of the rela- 
tions among propositions and the content of these forms are the state- 
ments themselves. These statements are, however, categorical and refer 
to classes or relations among properties of objects. But again, these latter 
relations are the form of concrete operations. This implies that formal 
reasoning is neither “pure” nor “abstract” in the sense of making no 
reference to meaningful content. On the contrary, there is a “bilevel” or 
nested content consisting of statements at one level, and their content 
(i.e., that to which they refer) at a lower level. 
Regarding the form-content distinction at the formal and concrete lev- 
els Piaget (1972) remarks 
One of these two domains of logic [i.e., concrete and formal operations] is . 
more “pure” or more formalized than the other, but it is question of degree and not 
of a natural opposition. (p. 37) 
Said another way, a concrete operational child would be able to reason 
about class relations such as the relative extension of subclasses and 
superordinant classes (e.g., “Are there more red beads or wooden 
beads?“) which bear directly on the objects. The formal operational sub- 
ject, on the other hand, can reason about interpropositional constructions 
such as the implication relation between the propositions “it’s a terrier” 
and “it’s a dog” contained in the statement “if it’s a terrier then it’s a 
dog. ’ ’ Notice that the proposition has meaningful content but is also 
categorical. 
Another test of the attainment of formal operations would be, then, to 
look for age differences in the ability to draw appropriate inferences about 
categorical statements. For example, one can employ the syllogism for- 
mat and require inferences like “If it’s a terrier then it’s a dog. It’s not a 
terrier. Is it a dog?.” Correct performance on such task relies on the 
ability to reason about these statements but also requires the prior con- 
struction of nested inclusions as described above. 
A number of studies have directly assessed children’s understanding of 
several of the binary operations using verbal or propositional reasoning 
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tasks. On these tasks, subjects are presented with statements constructed 
with logical connectives (e.g., “if-then” and “either-or”) and are asked 
to either make deductive inferences using these statements as premises, 
or to make truth judgments about them. The binary operations which 
have been considered in recent studies include (a) conditional implication 
(e.g., Byrnes & Overton, 1986; Moshman, 1977; O’Brien & Overton, 
1980, 1982), (b) disjunction (e.g., Beilin & Lust, 1975; Moshman, 1977; 
Neimark & Slotnick, 1971), (c) conjunction (e.g., Beilin & Lust, 1975; 
Neimark & Slotnick, 1971), and (d) biconditional equivalence (e.g., By- 
rnes, 1985; Roberge, 1976; Roberge & Flexer, 1979). These concepts can 
be expressed by “if-then,” “either-or,” “and,” and “if and only if,” 
respectively. Generally, these studies show that children seem to under- 
stand the binary operations associated with these connectives beginning 
in early adolescence. Performance is optimal when meaningful semantic 
content (i.e., categorical or causal) and linguistic feedback to elicit the 
logical meaning of the connectives are used. Such procedures are neces- 
sary because there is a poor fit between the natural language interpreta- 
tions and the logical interpretations of “if’ (Geis & Zwicky, 1971), “ei- 
ther-or” (Neimark & Slotnick, 1971), and “and” (Braine, 1978). “If’ is 
commonly interpreted as “if and only if, ” “either-or” takes on its ex- 
clusive rather than inclusive meaning, and “and” is interpreted as indi- 
cating a temporal sequence (i.e., “p and then q”) in natural language 
contexts. Simply pointing out directly or indirectly that the logical mean- 
ing is desired greatly improves performance in subjects ages 10-l 1 and 
older. 
In addition to demonstrating that subjects understand the logical mean- 
ing of these connectives, several studies show that subjects comprehend 
another interpropositional operation, the relation between a binary oper- 
ation and its negation (Byrnes, 1985; Byrnes & Overton, 1986; O’Brien & 
Overton, 1982; Overton, Byrnes, & O’Brien, 1985). These studies have 
shown significant changes between the fourth and the sixth grades in the 
understanding that only the case “p and not-q” falsifies an “if p then q” 
hypothesis using Wason’s (1966) Four Card task and conditional syllo- 
gisms. 
A further finding relates to the model’s structural description of how all 
of the binary operations can be expressed in multiple, equivalent ways 
(see Table 2). For example, “Either it’s Tuesday or it’s Wednesday” and 
“If it’s not Tuesday, then it’s Wednesday” both express the same logical 
relation and are, hence, logically equivalent to each other (Quine, 1950). 
Piaget (1972) describes how each of the binary operations stands in such 
equivalence relations. Basing tasks on this model, Byrnes (1985) found 
that lo-to 13-year-olds recognized the equivalence of sentence pairs at a 
rate of 82% correct. 
Perhaps it is best, however, to characterize the propositional reasoning 
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of early adolescents as reasoning based on structures which are in the 
process of becoming consolidated rather than on a consolidated set of 
structures; that is, there are a multitude of “links” which have to be 
established between the 16 binary operations (as in Table 2) and it is likely 
that these links are formed progressively. Moshman (1977), for example, 
found that the performance of adolescents on a task requiring reasoning 
about concepts of implication and disjunction follows a pattern of con- 
solidation rather than an abrupt onset. This pattern is entirely consistent 
with Inhelder and Piaget’s (1958) and Piaget’s (1972) claims that the for- 
mal level consists of an early formatory sublevel and a later consolidated 
sublevel. Both sublevels are, however, characterized by interproposi- 
tional relations as form and statements as content, though in the latter 
sublevel these relations are completed and integrated. It is the appearance 
of new forms which reintegrate old forms that makes for the qualitative 
change between the concrete and the formal levels-not the emergence of 
a complete and fully integrated system. This characterization implies, 
then, that the change is by no means abrupt or saltatory. 
It must be noted that recent studies have also found that there are some 
kinds of inferences, such a modus ponens on syllogism tasks, that even 
5-year-olds can make quite well (see Braine & Rumain, 1983, for a 
review). This finding represents an anomaly for which the present model 
needs to account. In order to account for this finding, it must be empha- 
sized that none of the essential aspects outlined here should be considered 
in isolation, as a necessary and sufficient condition for the attribution of 
formal reasoning. Each of them are, on the contrary, simply necessary 
criteria which in conjunction represent formal operational thought. 
Hence, all aspects must be present, but none are sufficient to warrant the 
attribution of formal reasoning to an individual. Therefore, the incidence 
of composing propositions in inferential chains as in modus ponens (i.e., 
“If p then q. P therefore q”) in kindergartners is insufficient for arguing 
that these children evidence formal operational reasoning. Such inference 
making can be considered a precursor ability which becomes incorporat- 
ed into the subsequent level of formal reasoning. 
HYPOTHETICAL REASONING 
A final essential aspect of formal operational thought related to that of 
propositonal reasoning is the ability to reason hypothetically. More than 
simply the ability to reason about “if-then” hypotheses, it is argued that 
the label refers to treating any statement as if it were true, even those 
which the subject knows in fact are not true (Matalon, 1962). It is because 
statements are the content of formal thought that hypothetical reasoning 
becomes possible. 
But it is important to point out that in order to reason hypothetically, 
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competent formal reasoners in any culture have to be aware of the ap- 
propriate linguistic expressions that denote, among other things, counter- 
factuals and statements about unactualized possibilities. Experimentally, 
if one wanted to test a subject’s ability to reason hypothetically, perhaps 
the most discriminative and accurate tests would be those which employ 
counter-factual terms such as “were” and “would be.” It is argued that 
most subjects would not treat a sentence such as “if elephants are cold- 
blooded then they are not mammals” as a counterfactual because of the 
present indicative tense of the verbs employed. They would be more 
likely to treat a sentence such as “if elephants were cold-blooded, then 
they would be not be mammals” as a counterfactual. The subjunctive tense 
of the verb changes the pragmatic assumptions surrounding the “if’ 
statement (Scholnick & Wing, 1982; Wing & Scholnick, 1981). Because 
subjects have acquired the capacity to reason about propositions and 
have learned the appropriate marked terms, they are assumed to make a 
discrimination between these surface expressions. Additionally, they are 
assumed to cognitively alter the actual physiology of elephants hypothet- 
ically so that elephants are attributed a property which is not part of the 
intension for the class of mammals. Subjects can then assess the entail- 
ment relation between the antecedent and the consequent; that is, they 
would assess whether it is possible for an elephant to be cold-blooded and 
still be a mammal. 
What this description implies, then, is that in testing for hypothetical 
reasoning it is important to (a) employ content which is modifiable hypo- 
thetically, i.e., about which the subject is likely to have organized knowl- 
edge, and (b) use the appropriate tense, etc., of the statements within an 
experiment. There is a tendency, however, in the propositional reasoning 
domain (e.g., Wason, 1983; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) to ignore both 
of these constraints. For example, in studies of conditional reasoning 
which employ Wason’s (1966) Four Card task, the subject is expected to 
treat the content of sentences like “if there is a D on one side of a card, 
there is a 7 on the other” as ifit were a conditional relation. A conditional 
relation, however, is one where the antecedent (p) is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition for the consequent (4) and where the antecedent 
entails the consequent. This means that if the antecedent is true, then the 
consequent must be true (entailment) but also that the antecedent is not 
the only way to obtain the consequent (sufficiency). Two content domains 
which reflect conditional relations are sufficient causality (e.g., “if it rains 
then the grass gets wet”) and class inclusion relations. The arbitrary 
content used by Wason and his colleagues cannot be transformed hypo- 
thetically into relations such as class inclusion or sufficient causality by 
analogy because there is np basis for the analogy. Also, it is argued that 
subjects would only attempt such analogy if the subjunctive tense were 
employed. It is precisely because the above sentence concerning ele- 
80 JAMES P. BYRNES 
phants taps into existing knowledge and the proper tense is employed that 
the entailment can be assessed by analogy. 
This feature of hypothetical reasoning taken together with the combi- 
natorial aspect forms the additional aspect of the subordination of the real 
to the possible; that is, that which the subject knows is true about this 
world becomes a subset of what is logically possible (Inhelder & Piaget, 
1958). Stated another way, the combination of the factual with the coun- 
terfactual (as described by the subject’s constructed propositions) forms 
a universe of possibilities. An important difference between the present 
account and that of Inhelder and Piaget is that possibility is argued here 
to stem from linguistic-cognitive conversion abilities whereas the latter 
authors argue that possibility is mostly the result of generating all the 
possible combinations of object attributes. 
Only a handful of studies have empirically addressed the hypothetical 
reasoning aspect. Meyer (1977) asked 5-, 6-, and 9-year-olds and adults to 
draw conclusions from counterfactual conditional statements. He found 
that the 5-and 6-year-olds would not accept the premises due to a strict 
reality orientation. The 9-year-olds showed less of an adherence to real- 
ism, but their reasoning was largely based on a linguistic orientation; that 
is, they did not reason about hypothetical properties (e.g., oranges that 
are square) as much as refer to the specific wording of the premise as if it 
reflected an immutable law. The college students, on the other hand, 
evidence true contrary-to-fact reasoning in that they accepted the coun- 
terfactual premises as logically necessary for argument’s sake, and rea- 
soned accordingly. Scholnick & Wing (1983) found similar results where 
12-and 15-year-olds and adults reasoned correctly 65% of the time on 
syllogisms using “if’ premises in the subjunctive tense. When these sub- 
jects were incorrect, they tended to reject conclusions based on the coun- 
terfactual, i.e., empirically false, outcome. 
In a related fashion, Moshman and Franks (1986) asked subjects to sort 
“if-then” transitive inference problems which varied on semantic con- 
tent, empirical truth, and validity dimensions. The valid-only problems 
were, in effect, counterfactuals (e.g., “If elephants are either animals or 
plants, and elephants are not animals, then elephants are plants.“). Even 
though the subjunctive tense was not employed for the valid-only prob- 
lems, 45% of seventh graders and 85% of college students sorted prob- 
lems on the basis of validity whereas no fourth grader did. Also, when 
asked to rank the three most logical problems, 0% of the fourth graders, 
35% of the seventh graders, and 61% of the adults chose the problems 
involving validity. 
SUMMARY OF THE ESSENTIAL ASPECTS 
In summary, then, formal operational reasoning is made possible by the 
construction of nested inclusions of information (operations on opera- 
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tions), the generalization of vicariance into the set of all combinations, 
and the construction of a propositional representation of acquired knowl- 
edge which makes hypothetical reasoning possible. My review of the 
relevant literature with respect to each aspect shows significant support 
for the structural predictions made by the model. It should be pointed out, 
however, that many of the reviewed studies were simply concerned with 
age trends for specific abilities and were not concerned with verifying the 
model I have proposed here. Therefore, there is a need for additional 
studies which directly test each of the proposed structural differences 
between concrete and formal operational subjects. The positive heuristics 
to follow are offered as guidelines for testing the structural model of 
formal operations described here. 
POSITIVE HEURISTICS 
As described earlier, positive heuristics outline research strategies 
meant to avoid anomalies. However, Lakatos (1971) also points out that 
positive heuristics should advance a given theory so as to better account 
for a certain class of phenomena. The present section outlines research 
strategies which are meant to advance a structural study of adolescent 
reasoning, but are also meant to provide strong tests of the formal oper- 
ations model. 
First, a true test of the model should assess the emergence of specific 
structural links which make possible a class of inferences which were not 
evident before. The formal operations model provides examples of these 
links such as the relation between a direct operation and its negation, the 
logical equivalence of multiple surface expressions for the same binary 
operation, and the syllogistic inferences. Tests of these relations are more 
than assessments of children’s comprehension of the semantics of a single 
expression constructed with logical connectives such as “if’ or “either- 
or”; They assess the relations between statements or propositions and 
hence, assess interpropositional reasoning. Methodologically, one should 
present statements which may or may not refer to observable objects or 
relations, and require inferences about these statements as well as justi- 
fications of these inferences. Such an approach directly addresses prop- 
ositional reasoning and avoids many of the problems associated with 
protocol data obtained from Inhelder and Piaget’s (1958) tasks. In a re- 
lated argument, Falmagne (1980) draws a distinction between proposi- 
tional reasoning tasks and Inhelder and Piaget’s “scientific” reasoning 
tasks. She argues that the latter only become propositional reasoning 
tasks if the subject encodes the data by way of the appropriate proposi- 
tions or statements. 
Second, one should exploit performance variables and feedback in the 
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direction of favoring optimal performance in order to show age trends in 
the organization and representation of already acquired knowledge. What 
is unique to the Piagetian approach can be summarized as such: it is not 
that older children know “more” about a given topic (e.g., classes) but 
that this knowledge is organized in a different way (e.g., nested inclu- 
sions) and this organized knowledge is accessible by way of a new level 
of representation (e.g., propositions). Age trends, however, can only be 
shown (or not shown, for that matter) when the content of tasks if familiar 
to the age groups and when feedback is given which indicates that the 
logical interpretation of connectives is desired. 
Moreover, each of the binary operations specifies a particular organi- 
zation of knowledge as Table 3 implies. If the primary focus of a given 
study is to assess age differences in particular levels of organization and 
representation, then it is necessary to employ semantic content which 
conforms to these organizations experimentally. For example, one should 
employ class inclusion or suflicient causality content for conditional rea- 
soning tasks, or content which describes perfectly correlated attributes 
for biconditional reasoning tasks, etc. Also, the content for a given task 
should be isomorphic to the taxonomic relations specified in a given cul- 
ture and should reflect the naturally occurring space-time relations of the 
content. Violations in these constraints either hinder the detection of or 
distort age-related trends in organization and representation. 
If, on the other hand, the focus is on whether subjects can detect the 
formal similarities between logical arguments as in Moshman and Franks 
(1986), then the content can be varied based on the validity, truth, and 
falsity dimensions. 
Finally, as specified above, hypothetical reasoning can only be accu- 
rately assessed by employing content which can be altered hypothetically 
and by employing the proper tense. For example, subjects need to know 
the intension-extension relations of a given class before they can hypo- 
thetically delete properties or treat an object as if it were a member of 
another class. 
All these constraints on content by no means imply that formal oper- 
ational subjects are reality bound. It is precisely because their organiza- 
tion of “real” information can be accessed and altered by language that 
thought becomes liberated from objects. To say that thought is liberated 
from reasoning only about real objects, as in counterfactual reasoning, by 
no means implies that form and content become “dissociated” at the 
formal level; it simply means that language provides the means to reason 
about objects that are hypothetically constructed by analogy. 
It should be pointed out that all these heuristics are in accord with 
Piaget (1962) who argues that the formal operations model is meant to be 
a model of natural logic and not a model of a formally pure logic. The goal 
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was to provide a structural system which accurately describes how ado- 
lescents and adults actually reason with meaningful content. 
CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of this paper, I drew a distinction between “knowing 
that” and “knowing how” at the level of formal operations. It should be 
clear at this point that my emphasis on the organization of knowledge is 
very different than other descriptions of formal operations (e.g., Braine & 
Rumain, 1983; Keating, 1980; Strauss & Kroy, 1977). This is precisely 
because these authors have all emphasized the scientific problem-solving 
strategies in their descriptions. This overemphasis is entirely due, I think. 
to the fact that the only translated work on formal operations available is 
that of Inhelder and Piaget (1958). It should be noted, however, that the 
majority of Genevan studies on formal reasoning since the 1958 book such 
as Beth et al. (1962) and Piaget et al. (1977, 1978) have focused on prop- 
ositional reasoning in “natural contexts” and on changes in the organi- 
zation of knowledge. 
Whereas it is argued in this review that the tasks described in Inhelder 
and Piaget (1958) only indirectly assess the structural changes described 
here (since they mostly assess the “knowing how” aspects), Inhelder and 
Piaget argue that all of their tasks require interpropositional and hypo- 
thetical reasoning ability. I am not necessarily disputing this point, but I 
am arguing that this claim has led to the current rejection of the model. A 
historical account of the acceptance or rejection of the formal operations 
model in American psychological circles shows that the key issue is 
whether one accepts the claim that successful performance on Inhelder 
and Piaget’s tasks necessarily requires subjects to reason via the 16 binary 
operations. Inhelder and Piaget apparently felt that their claim was 
strengthened by evidence gained from protocols which they formalized 
using the 16 binary operations. However, this methodological approach is 
unsatisfactory for the advancement of the theory for two reasons. The 
first is that none of the recent studies reviewed in Keating (1980), Meehan 
(1984), or Neimark (1979) provide the reader with actual protocols. The 
authors relate that stage scoring is “based on” Inhelder and Piaget (1958). 
It is very possible that differences in scoring have led to the disparity in 
reported success rates on these tasks. The second, and more serious 
reason is that critics of the theory remain entirely unconvinced by the 
protocols selected by Inhelder and Piaget as supportive of their claims 
(see, for example, Braine & Rumain, 1983; Bynum, Thomas, & Weitz, 
1972; Ennis, 1975; Keating, 1980). The argument that opponents seem to 
make is that since it is possible to come up with other apparently adequate 
models of reasoning, and since the protocol data is dubious, one need not 
accept the claim that the 16 binary operations so defined are necessary for 
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successful solution of these tasks. From a philosophy of science stand- 
point, it would seem that Inhelder and Piaget’s (1958) choice of tasks has 
led to an apparent inability to explain anomalies and to a desire to reject 
the model. From a Piagetian standpoint, the need for more fruitful posi- 
tive heuristics is clear. It is my contention that the model proposed here 
has generated and will continue to generate successful research strate- 
gies. 
Some final comments are in order regarding what aspects of formal 
operational thought that I have not considered to be essential. First, I 
made no specification regarding the role of age in the model. My inter- 
pretation of numerous Piagetian works is that the finding that children 
typically evidence many aspects of formal operations at around age 11 is 
a contingent and nonnecessary empirical fact. It is interesting but nones- 
sential that children move through the stages in many content domains 
and enter the formal stage at around 11, but theoretically and empirically 
it is possible to find formal operational subjects at a lower age. Therefore, 
a child’s age is a nonessential aspect of formal operations. Second, there 
is no need to retain the notion of “cross-domain generality” in order to 
adopt the present (or former) model of formal operations. One need only 
require that the order of cognitive development proceed from sensori- 
motor to formal operations for every content domain with which the child 
has experience. Hence, it is possible to be “formal” in some areas and 
“concrete” in others. It is my contention that once a child uses the 16 
binary operations to construct a propositional representation of a given 
content (which can also be characterized by the other essential aspects), 
this child can be said to have entered the level (not “stage”) of formal 
operations for that domain. The key criterion, then, is the nature of the 
form and content as specified earlier in this paper. It is unlikely, however, 
that children construct knowledge (or “gain expertise”) in only one do- 
main, and that it is likely that many related domains are constructed at the 
formal level simultaneously. Regardless, the notion of cross-domain gen- 
erality is also a deletable construct. An extended justification for the 
above deletions is obviously in order, but is outside the scope of this 
paper. 
In summary, I am arguing that the adoption of the formal operations 
model proposed here and the deletion of the notions of “contentless” 
reasoning, age as an essential component, and cross-domain generality 
make for a significantly more viable and accurate model of adolescent 
reasoning than the former model of formal operations. The next obvious 
step is to integrate the present recasted model of “knowing that” with 
current models of “knowing how.” 
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